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We would like to thank the discussants for the
valuable insights and for commenting on important
aspects of model checking that we did not touch in
our paper. Our goal was modest (but crucial): to se-
lect an appropriate distribution with which to judge
the compatibility of the data with a hypothesized
(hierarchical) model, when the test statistic is not
ancillary and an improper prior is used for the hy-
perparameters. Since it is important to emphasize
that this is by no means the only aspect of model
checking, the discussants’ complementary contribu-
tions and comments are all most welcome. The spe-
cific technical contributions of Evans and Johnson
are also appreciated, since their developments in this
area were not mentioned in our review.
Several discussants have highlighted the impor-
tance of graphical displays in model checking. We
will not comment on this because we entirely agree.
We similarly agree with most of the discussants’
other comments, although in this rejoinder we mainly
concentrate on disagreements. Our comments are or-
ganized around the main topics that arise in the
discussions. We keep the same notation and termi-
nology used in the paper (although it does conflict
with the notation used by some of the discussants).
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ROLE OF PRIOR PREDICTIVE
DISTRIBUTIONS WHEN MODEL
UNCERTAINTY IS PRESENT
Bayesian analyses, when model uncertainty is
present (model choice, model averaging), are based
on the prior predictive distributions for the differ-
ent models under consideration. Model checking is
a quick-and-dirty shortcut to bypass model choice,
and “pure” Bayesian reasoning indicates that all rel-
evant information lies in the (prior) predictive dis-
tribution m(x) for the entertained model.
As Evans points out, objective Bayes methodol-
ogy should be guided by proper Bayes methodol-
ogy, so objective Bayes model checking should also
be based on the prior predictive distribution. The
difficulty, however, is that only some aspects of this
distribution can be utilized when the prior distribu-
tion is improper. Bayarri and Berger (1997, 1999,
2000) argue that the relevant aspect to consider for
model checking is a conditional (prior) predictive
distribution m(x | u), where U = U(X) is an ap-
propriate conditioning statistic such that the pos-
terior pi(θ | u) is proper. Model checks (measures of
surprise) computed with this distribution (such as
p-values or relative surprise) are called conditional
predictive measures.
If we use a statistic T to measure departure and
use U for conditioning, the relevant distribution for
model checking is then m(t | u). Evans’ prescription
can be put in this framework with T ancillary and
U sufficient (caution: Evans’ notation switches the
roles of T and U ). Larsen and Lu’s (from now on
L&L) prescription for checking group i is also of this
form with T = T (Xi) and U =X(−i). The complete
theory of Johnson (not sketched in his discussion)
relies on the whole prior predictive. Hence, all these
methods produce legitimate Bayesian measures of
surprise. The posterior predictive distribution can-
not be expressed in this way (it would produce a
trivial, degenerate distribution).
Bayarri and Berger (1997, 1999) explore several
choices of U and recommend use of the conditional
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MLE of θ, that is, the MLE computed in the con-
ditional distribution f(x | t,θ). The resulting mea-
sures of surprise (or model checks) were shown to ba-
sically coincide with the partial posterior measures;
indeed, the conditional predictive distribution for
that choice of U and the partial posterior predictive
distribution are asymptotically equivalent (Robins
(1999); Robins, van der Vaart and Ventura (2000)).
We have concentrated on partial posterior mea-
sures because they are basically indistinguishable
from the conditional predictive ones and they are
easier to compute, but their Bayesian justification
comes from the conditional predictive reasoning. We
should perhaps have reiterated this in the paper.
CHOICE OF T AND/OR D
We are not addressing optimal choice of T in this
paper: we focus on the choice of the relevant distri-
bution to locate T . T is often chosen casually based
on intuitive grounds and we wanted a method that
would work with any choice of the departure statis-
tic T (although, of course, adequate choice of T is al-
ways important to increase power). However, several
discussants have focused their discussion on specific
choices, so we comment on those.
A preliminary issue is consideration of discrepancy
measures, that is, functions of the data and the pa-
rameters D =D(x,θ), as well as statistics T = T (x)
for model checking. Gelman and L&L favor their
routine use, also with informal, intuitively sound
choices. Johnson’s proposal, although derived from
a different philosophy, could also be considered un-
der this umbrella. Johnson’s interesting method ap-
plies to invariant situations in which the distribution
of an optimally chosen D, namely a pivotal quan-
tity, is precisely known. Johnson’s elegant theorem
shows how to obtain simulations from the pivotal
quantities for the true (unknown) parameter values,
so that their adequacy with the known distribution
can be assessed. The main difficulty is that these
simulations are highly correlated and proper assess-
ments require prior predictive techniques (and hence
informative priors). In some situations, the provided
bounds for the p-values of the suggested test statis-
tic might suffice, so these techniques are definitely
worth considering. Note, however, that without an
informative prior, interpretation of graphical dis-
plays, or other uses of these correlated simulations,
is an issue.
Although our methodology could be applied to
such functions [it would probably suffice to con-
sider the joint conditional distribution p(x,θ | u)],
we have not thought about it enough to venture an
opinion. Use of D’s seems intuitive; however, when
used in conjunction with posterior predictive distri-
butions, they suffer from the same type of conserva-
tiveness as statistics do (Robins (1999);
Robins, van der Vaart and Ventura (2000)). Since
the problems are the same whether or not T is cho-
sen to also include parameters, we cast the rest of
the rejoinder in terms of traditional statistics T .
(Note that, if T is ancillary or D pivotal, the issues
about how to integrate out the parameters disap-
pear.)
Evans chooses not to integrate out the unknown θ
but rather to eliminate it in traditional frequentist
ways, by either conditioning on a sufficient statistic
(i.e., U above is sufficient) or by using an ancillary
test statistic T . His argument is, however, also well
within Bayesian thinking, providing a beautiful fac-
torization of the joint (prior) distribution of x and θ
in which the role of the different factors can be very
nicely interpreted. Although these specific choices
of T and U are needed for the clean factorization,
we show that other choices of T and/or U are also
possible (maybe desirable) for model checking, and
might be simpler to implement. This applies spe-
cially to problems in which the required statistics
do not exist, are difficult to identify, or when sam-
pling from the resulting distribution is particularly
challenging.
Johnson wonders about choices of T sufficient (or
nearly so) and/or T ancillary. T should not be suf-
ficient; a sufficient T is virtually useless for model
checking (this is in agreement with Evans’ remarks).
An extensive discussion of this issue, with exam-
ples, can be found in Bayarri and Berger (1997),
Bayarri and Berger (2000) and rejoinder. An ancil-
lary T simply reproduces frequentist testing with
similar p-values (terminology from Bayarri and Berger
(1999), 2000); the Bayesian machinery for integrat-
ing out unknown quantities is simply not needed
and, in this case, prior, posterior, conditional and
partial posterior predictive distributions are all iden-
tical to the specified marginal distribution for T ,
f(t). When T is nearly ancillary, then all procedures
will produce very similar model checks.
L&L suggest choosing for group i a Ti which is a
function of the data Xi (and possibly the parame-
ters) and as Ui the rest of the data. As L&L indicate,
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there might be some concern about losing power,
but certainly the behavior is much better than that
of posterior predictive measures (as clearly shown
by L&L’s Table 1). As we remarked before, this
avoids double use of the data if we were only test-
ing that group. Our main concern is how to properly
interpret all these Ti’s jointly. L&L have been very
careful not to compute any p-value based on overall
measures. For instance, using the overall discrep-
ancy measures T1 =max{X¯i}, T2 =max{|X¯i − X¯|}
and T3 =max{|X¯i − µ|} produces p-values equal to
0.479,0.619 and 0.476, respectively, thus showing
the same undesirable behavior as posterior predic-
tive p-values, and the concern about double use of
the data still arises. (For a simple example of simi-
lar issues with cross-validation p-values, see the re-
joinder to Professor Carlin in Bayarri and Berger
(1999).) If we keep the p-values individually, it is
not very clear what to do with them. One concern
is that they are probably highly correlated, and then
displays of uniformity might mean little; another
important concern is with multiplicity issues, espe-
cially when there are many groups. Of course the
multiplicity issue gets worsened when, in addition
to having many groups, one considers many T ’s for
each group. The only way that we know to satis-
factorily handle multiplicities is Bayesian model se-
lection analysis, and the complexity of the problem
escalates (and again requires proper priors).
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
In the discussion, various interesting methodolog-
ical issues arose. We briefly address the main issues
here.
Model elaboration. Gelman and Johnson touch on
model elaboration followed by inference as an al-
ternative to model checking. In the situation con-
templated in this paper, however, in which we are
seriously entertaining a model, an analysis with a
single, more complex model would not be adequate.
Correct Bayesian analysis should acknowledge the
uncertainty in the model assessment, utilizing model
selection (between the more elaborated and the sim-
pler models) or model averaging. This is indeed the
ideal Bayesian analysis, but both the analysis and
the prior assessments are considerably harder than
those required for our model checking proposal.
Avoiding the full model uncertainty analysis in sit-
uations where we are reasonably confident in the
assessed model was precisely the motivation for de-
veloping an objective Bayes model checking proce-
dure. Of course, if the model is found incompatible
with the data, then a full model selection analysis
cannot be avoided.
Avoiding double use of the data. Evans suggests
that, to avoid double use of the data, our choices
for T and U should satisfy his factorization of the
joint distribution, at least asymptotically. There is
no need for this: we avoid double use of the data
by conditioning. Also, there is no need for T and
U to be independent (as when splitting the data),
nor for T to be sufficient nor for U to be ancillary
(in our notation, not Evans’). Computing a mean
and a variance of the same posterior distribution is
not using the data twice; it is describing two charac-
teristics of that distribution. Similarly, focusing on
one “slice” (a conditional distribution) of the joint
prior predictive m(x) is not using the data twice,
but using a specific characteristic of that distribu-
tion. To illustrate with the simplest discrete exam-
ple, if T = (x1, x2) and U = x1, then m(t | uobs) =
m(x1, x2 | x1 = uobs) =m(x2 | x1 = uobs) if x1 = uobs
and 0 otherwise; x1 and x2 are used for different
things, but not used twice. Note that posterior pre-
dictive checks cannot be cast in this way. This is-
sue is also discussed at length in the rejoinder of
Bayarri and Berger (2000).
Accounting for uncertainty in the estimates. Gel-
man argues that there must be something wrong
in our recommendation of plug-in checks over pos-
terior predictive checks, since the former do not ac-
count for uncertainty in the estimates. It is true that
plug-in checks make two mistakes—using the data
twice and ignoring the uncertainty in the estimates—
whereas posterior predictive checks only make the
first mistake. Crucially, however, the second “mis-
take” that is made by plug-in checks actually oper-
ates in the opposite direction of the first mistake,
and brings the resulting p-value closer to unifor-
mity. This was formally shown to be the case in
Robins, van der Vaart and Ventura (2000), but can
also be understood intuitively: when the data are
very incompatible with the model, posterior pre-
dictive (and plug-in) distributions sit in the wrong
part of the space (the parameters are overtuned to
accommodate for model deficiency) but, since the
plug-in distribution is (wrongly) more concentrated
than the posterior predictive distribution, it is less
compatible with extreme values of test statistics,
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and hence is less conservative. It is the theorem
in Robins, van der Vaart and Ventura (2000) that
shows the correction is not an overcompensation,
that is, that the plug-in still remains conservative,
while possessing more power. The plug-in predictive
checks are also often easier to compute. Note that
this superior performance of the plug-in checks oc-
curs regardless of the specific form of checking used,
that is, whether it is formal or graphical.
LIMITATIONS
We are sympathetic to the complaints concerning
the difficulty of computing partial posterior (and
conditional) predictive checks, but it can be done
and the difficulty is only in estimating a (usually)
univariate density at one point, not a difficult com-
putation compared to most Bayesian computations
nowadays. However, we recognize that more work is
needed to develop fast and efficient algorithms to
carry out the necessary computations. For invariant
situations, the computations for posterior simula-
tions from the pivotal quantity are simpler, but only
when the computed bounds are satisfactory (and the
test procedure adequate); otherwise, proper inter-
pretation of the simulated values (whether for visual
displays or numerical computations) requires prior
predictive techniques, which not only need a proper
prior, but also are of a similar level of complexity
as the partial posterior predictive technique. Cross-
validation may or may not be simpler to compute.
The computations required for m(g(x) | u) for a suf-
ficient statistic U (and g any function of
the data) are likely to be formidable; in
Bayarri, Castellanos and Morales (2006) we
actually suggest use of MCMC computations to gen-
erate from m(g(x) | u) which are basically
identical to the ones used for conditional and partial
posterior predictive distributions. For any T
(and discrepancy D), Robins (1999) and
Robins, van der Vaart and Ventura (2000) suggest
how to “center” them so as to produce asymptoti-
cally uniform p-values, and this can also be a daunt-
ing task. Posterior predictive techniques are usually
simpler to compute than partial posterior or condi-
tional predictive techniques.
Another limitation of our methodology is that it
does not say anything about choosing T . Choice of
T is equivalent to informally choosing the aspect of
the model to be checked. What we advocate, once a
statistic T has been chosen to detect incompatibil-
ity between data and model, is to locate the ob-
served t in the distribution of m(t | u) [or in its
approximation m(t | xobs\tobs)]. In the language of
Gelman, one should get the “replicates” for model
checks from those distributions. This prescription
holds whether T is univariate or multivariate, and
whether one uses graphics, residuals, relative sur-
prise, p-values or other methods to formally or in-
formally locate T in m(t | u). This addresses one of
Gelman’s concerns. (Of course, if T is multivariate,
the definition of the p-value is not clear.) We do
recognize, however, that choice of T is an impor-
tant issue. Evans and Johnson have both addressed
this issue and their suggestions are certainly sen-
sible and worth considering. We do recommend a
specific choice of U , namely the conditional MLE.
Robert and Rousseau (2002) and Fraser and Rousseau
(2005) suggest use of the unconditional MLE in-
stead; this choice is also worth exploring.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
In the discussions, a number of the statements
made concerning our methodology are incorrect.
These statements refer to issues that were discussed
in our earlier papers where the methodology was
first presented, and so we neglected to review these
issues in this paper. We try to straighten out some
of these misunderstandings here.
Gelman suggests that our methodology focuses on
using p-values as a model-rejection rule with speci-
fied Type-I errors. This is not the case. We do not
fix Type-I errors, nor do we advocate use of p-values
as formal decision rules (indeed, we are quite op-
posed to it; see Sellke, Bayarri and Berger (2001),
and Hubbard and Bayarri (2003)). Indeed, the
methodology is valid whether or not p-values are
used. We use p-values as “measures of surprise”:
numerical quantifications of the incompatibility of
the observed t and the “reference” distribution; an-
other such measure is the relative predictive surprise
also explored in the paper (and which can readily be
applied to multivariate T ’s). Alternatively, one can
opt for checking informally this incompatibility with
graphical displays. The main advantage of p-values
is pedagogical: statisticians are used to interpreting
them. Of course, this familiarity is a detriment when
procedures such as posterior predictive p-values are
used, in that casual users will interpret the p-values
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as arising from a uniform distribution, not suspect-
ing that they are instead arising from a distribution
much more concentrated about 1/2.
Gelman and Johnson imply that the methodol-
ogy can only be applied to simple examples and
univariate statistics. This is not so. We use “sim-
ple” examples so that the numerical complexity does
not obscure the relevant issues. As mentioned ear-
lier, there is nothing in the methodology to prevent
it being used with multivariate statistics. Similarly,
although we use p-values and relative surprise (nu-
merical quantifications), one can use graphical dis-
plays of simulations from m(t | u) in the same way
as the discussants use graphical displays from their
proposed distributions.
Johnson conjectures that our p-values can be an-
ticonservative. Conditional predictive p-values can
never be uniformly conservative or anticonservative
since, as valid Bayesian p-values (i.e., based on the
prior predictive distribution), they are uniform on
average. Partial posterior predictive p-values are not
only asymptotically equivalent to the conditional
predictive p-values (for the proposed u), but very
often they are identical; when they are not, the par-
tial posterior and conditional predictive distribu-
tions are extremely similar even after very few obser-
vations. Of course, if one has an ancillary statistic,
one has exact uniformity, but this is rarely the case.
CONCLUSIONS
Model checking is subtle and has a variety of as-
pects, as clearly pointed out by the discussants. Op-
timal selection of T and U is still an issue, and
cross-validation might prove useful. A possible an-
swer is Evans’ proposals, but we find them unduly
limited. Use of pivotal quantities is certainly a pos-
sibility in invariant situations, but proper interpre-
tation in general would ultimately require prior pre-
dictive analysis and thus preclude use of improper
priors. Techniques that produce p-values near 0.5
when the model is obviously wrong are simply bad
techniques, whether one uses p-values, other charac-
teristics of the reference distributions, or graphical
displays. Such techniques can detect truly terrible
models, but the fact that they can have such poor
detection power means that “passing” such a model
check does very little to instill confidence that one
has a good model.
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